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LEASING AS A STRATEGIC FINANCING OPTION:  THE NAVY’S 
MARITIME PREPOSITIONED SHIPS EXPERIENCE 
Joseph G. San Miguel, John K. Shank and Donald E. Summers* 
   
ABSTRACT.  Recently, leasing has been prominent in the press due to the Air 
Force’s recent ill-fated attempt to obtain the use of Boeing re-fueling 
tankers.  Forgotten is that, in the early 1980’s, a highly controversial Navy 
long-term leasing program of Maritime Prepositioned Ships had a different 
result.  However, an unintended consequence of the Navy’s success was 
that future government leases were practically eliminated.  This research 
examines the issues and parties involved in this unprecedented creative and 
innovative leasing program for ships used by the Navy’s Military Sealift 
Command.  While the analysis concludes that the Navy’s leasing program 
was successful and cost effective, laws and policies were changed so that 
long-term leasing is no longer viable for the strategic financing of military 
requirements.  The case is presented here that existing laws and regulations 
should be reconsidered so that leased military resources can once again be 
used to provide and maintain national security. 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 25 and February 7, 2005, The Wall Street Journal 
confirmed a widely reported major shift in Department of Defense           
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(DOD) weapons acquisition policy over the next decade (Jaffe & Karp, 
2005; Pasztor, 2005).  They cite retired Admiral Arthur Cebrowski, 
head of the Pentagon’s Office of Force Transformation, who sees a 
significant shift away from capital-intensive weapons towards the 
more labor-intensive systems used in guerilla wars. 
Notwithstanding this transformative agenda, the Navy’s 2007 
and 2008 President’s Budget still makes a strong case for a steadily 
growing capital investment budget between 2006 and 2011.  The 
budget proposal submitted on February 23, 2005, by Admiral Bruce 
Engelhardt, Director of the Office of Budget in the Office of the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and 
Controller), shows proposed growth in annual weapons investments 
from $26 billion in 2004 to $42 billion in 2011 (Engelhardt, 2005).  
The key components of this budget include the new Joint Strike 
Fighters, DD(X) destroyers, Virginia-class nuclear submarines, and 
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA) to replace the aging P3 Fleet, 
among many other programs.  Not mentioned explicitly in Admiral 
Engelhardt’s report is the question of how to replace thirteen 
currently leased Maritime Prepositioned Ships (MPS) which support 
the readiness of three Marine Expeditionary Brigades.  The use of 
these ships was arranged in the early 1980’s through 25-year leases 
(five renewable periods of five years each), which will expire between 
2009 and 2011. 
This paper reviews the history of the MPS program to help assess 
the lessons for current Navy acquisition policy.  Today, there is a 
strong disposition against leasing as a financing strategy for the US 
military.  As just one piece of evidence, consider the recent firestorm 
of criticism, which met the Air Force’s attempt in 2002 to lease, 
instead of buy, replacements for 100 aging KC135E refueling tankers 
(Furber & Jaeger, 2004).   The evaluation of the MPS history 
presented here contributes significantly to an assessment of the 
efficacy of leasing as a component of future acquisition policy. 
SOME HISTORY ON THE POLICY PERSPECTIVE 
The Navy has a long history of leasing ships to augment military 
capability in times of war (Peters, 1979).  Over 450 supply ships, 
using merchant marine crews, were leased and deployed during 
World War II.   During the Korean War, over 200 leased ships were 
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deployed.  More recently, during the Vietnam War in 1972, the Navy 
entered into a lease agreement to charter nine new T-2 fuel tankers 
to replace 14 worn out World War II-vintage tankers.  Originally, 
appropriated funds were earmarked to build these new tankers.  
However, when acquisition proved infeasible because of budget 
limitations, DoD opted to approve a long-term lease (Haslam, Koenig, 
& Mitchell, 2004). 
The Navy also has a long history of leasing several categories of 
what might be called “off the shelf” auxiliary support equipment.  For 
example, leasing (rather than buying) is the financing mechanism of 
choice for such items as power storage batteries on nuclear 
submarines, reduction gears on surface warfare ships, and medical 
equipment in Navy hospitals. 
In spite of this historical context, the MPS program generated 
substantial controversy and political conflict between 1981 and 
1983.  It was the first peace time attempt to use leasing to acquire a 
multi-billion dollar pool of specially designed military equipment—
thirteen ships, each valued at more than $182 million.  But, the 
program was not originally intended to bypass normal acquisition and 
appropriation review channels. 
The MPS program grew out of the successful “Prepositioned 
Force” deployed in the late 1970’s at Diego Garcia in the Indian 
Ocean, which was made up of older cargo vessels.  Between 1977 
and 1979, this idea was expanded to a proposed fleet of thirteen 
specially designed cargo ships with sufficient Lift-off/Lift-on (LO-LO) 
and Roll-on/Roll-off (RO-RO) capabilities to support the equipment 
and supplies necessary for a rapid deployment of three Marine 
Expeditionary Brigades for thirty days of combat.  Depending on the 
technical characteristics, three or four ships were required for each 
Brigade.  This so-called TAKX Program was officially authorized by the 
Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) in 1979 (Haslam, Koenig, & 
Mitchell, 2004). 
Between 1979 and 1981, NAVSEA struggled to find a way to fit 
TAKX into the Navy’s procurement backlog.  In 1981, President 
Reagan launched a program to vigorously rebuild US military forces, 
including the vision of a “600 ship Navy” and increasing amphibious 
capabilities of the Marines.  Because many programs involving high-
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priority combat systems were simultaneously under consideration, 
Congress could not fund non-combat support ships (Peters, 1979). 
Yet, the Navy and the Pentagon felt strongly that the TAKX 
Program was indeed a high priority.  Updating the Military Sealift 
Command (MSC) was an essential component of the overall 
expansion program dictated by the threat of Soviet military power in 
the post-Vietnam stage of the Cold War.  MSC operates a Combat 
Prepositioned Force for the Marine Corps and a Logistics 
Prepositioned Force for the Navy, Air Force, and Defense Logistics 
Agency (DLA), as well as the Maritime Prepositioned Ships (Military 
Sealift Command, 2003), but only the MPS are leased.   
It is worth repeating, in this context, that the MPS leases were not 
seen primarily as a financing device for the TAKX Program.  The 
choice was not seen as “lease versus purchase,” but rather as “lease 
versus do without.”  In the detailed analysis of the MPS Program, it is 
important to keep this distinction in mind.  Either leasing is a 
financing option for assets whose acquisition has already been 
approved, or it is a mechanism to expand the asset base beyond the 
limits of the overall acquisition program. 
A SYNOPSIS OF THE POLICY DILEMMA 
There is no question that the legislative, regulatory, and political 
context today is structured such that leasing is not a viable option for 
billion dollar military programs.  If leasing is, in fact, not cost effective 
for US military acquisitions, the current structure is appropriate.   
The MPS Program, in retrospect, is seen as a significant military 
success.  Bailey and Escoe (2004) and Haslam, Koenig, and Mitchell 
(2004) document many important uses of the ships between 1985 
and 2005, including their crucial role in Operation Desert Storm in 
1991.  Without leasing, the TAKX ships would not have been 
acquired.  Thus, leasing can be seen as one of the crucial elements in 
the success of Desert Storm. 
Even if one were to grant the proposition that leasing is only an 
acceptable extension of acquisition policy under the exigencies of 
wartime, it is possible to counter that the events of September 11, 
2001, mean the US is “at war,” and will be for the foreseeable future.  
In that context, one can question whether it is appropriate to take 
leasing off the table today as an option to finance the on-going 
SAN MIGUEL, SHANK & SUMMERS  153 
 
“Global War on Terror (GWOT).” Leasing should be considered very 
carefully, prospectively, as a mechanism to augment defense 
capabilities without forcing cut backs in acquisition planning for other 
programs. That is, based on its merits, leasing is a way to expand 
defense capabilities beyond what can be paid for in the context of the 
year-by-year acquisition process. 
The Structure of the MPS Deal 
In October 1981, NAVSEA issued the Request for Proposal (RFP), 
which sought bids to supply thirteen ships for the MPS Program.  This 
was the largest single ship- financing program ever undertaken by the 
Navy, representing $2.65 billion.  Because of the tremendous scope 
and complexity of this program, the Navy also issued an RFP for 
consulting services.  Argent Group, Ltd. (AGL), a small investment 
banking firm specializing in leveraged-lease financing, was engaged. 
Although the program involved thirteen separate lease contracts, 
the structure of each lease contract was the same and all were 
implemented at the same time.  Each lease involved six principal 
participants:  The Owner/Lessor, Federal Financing Bank (FFB), 
Shipyard, Contractor, Operator (MSC), and the Navy.  Table 1 
summarizes the legal relationships in each lease and Figure 1 
summarizes the financial flows and business relationships.  
 
TABLE 1 
The Legal Relationships 
Contractor Award Private Investor/Owner Shipyard 
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FIGURE 1 





















The four stages of the lease for each ship were construction, 
financing, delivery, and time charter (Argent, 1982).  Following is a 
discussion of each stage. 
Construction 
- The Contractor negotiated a fixed-price construction contract with 
the shipyard and provided progress payments during 
construction. 
- The Contractor arranged interim loans to finance the 
construction. The Contractor assumed all risk associated with the 
loans until an acceptable ship was delivered to the Contractor. 
Construction Period Operating Period 
(1) Agreement to Charter, after 
construction 
(2) Construction Contract 
(3) Construction Loan Agreement 
(4) Construction Progress Payments 
(5) Construction Supervision 
Payments 
(6) Repay Construction Loans (30% 
Owner/70% FFB) 
(7) Delivery, subject to terms of 
construction contract 
(8) Operating Hire Payments 
(9) Capital Hire Payments 
(10) Ongoing Consulting Fees 
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- The Contractor was responsible for supervising the construction 
to ensure the ship was completed according to the specifications 
and plans, including the Navy’s operational and technical 
requirements.  The Contractor paid a supervisory fee to the 
Operator (MSC) to supervise construction. 
- The Navy retained the right to inspect the construction, but it 
could not deal directly with the shipyard, nor did it have any 
supervisory obligations, unilateral design change rights, or liability 
to the shipyard in the event of cost overruns. 
- The ships were constructed using current commercial 
specifications, known as American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) 
standards.  The ships were not built to the higher standards of 
military specifications. 
Financing 
- Prior to delivery, the Contractor arranged permanent financing for 
the ship, consisting of equity from private investors (30 percent) 
and debt from the Federal Financing Bank (FFB) (70 percent). 
- The private investors assumed ownership upon delivery of the 
ship.  They were eligible, under existing legislation, to receive 
accelerated depreciation tax benefits associated with ownership. 
- The debt was in the form of 25-year bonds purchased by the FFB, 
which holds a mortgage on each ship to secure the debt.   
Delivery 
- When the shipyard completed the vessel, it was delivered to the 
owner who simultaneously delivered it to the Contractor under a 
“bareboat charter.”  The proceeds of the debt and equity 
financing were used to pay off the interim construction loans. 
- The Contractor turned the ship over to the MSC under an 
operating contract.  The ship was chartered to the Navy under the 
Time Charter provisions. 
- Upon delivery, the construction cost of each ship was adjusted to 
reflect actual interest rates paid during construction on the 
interim construction loans. 
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Time Charter 
- The Navy began its charter hire payments (comprising both the 
capital hire and operating hire payments) upon delivery and 
acceptance of each ship. 
- The semi-annual capital hire payments are made on a “hell or 
high water” basis. Upon delivery, the capital hire rates were 
adjusted to reflect the actual debt and equity financing rates.  
Once adjusted, the Navy’s capital hire rates were fixed for the 
entire charter period.   
- Each Time Charter was an initial five-year contract with four five-
year renewal periods, for a total of 25 years.  If the Navy failed to 
exercise renewal options or terminated for convenience after the 
initial period, the vessel would be sold and the Navy would pay 
the difference between the selling price and the contractual 
termination value which was designed to repay the debt and give 
the owners their agreed upon return on investment of 11.745 
percent (after tax).  However, the Navy held an option to purchase 
the ships at the higher of the termination fee or market value. 
- The operating hire component is paid to the Contractor who in 
turn pays the MSC.  It includes operating expenses and a margin 
as agreed to in the contract.  The Contractor assumed the risk for 
all off-hire provisions and ship non-performance.  The Time 
Charter contains inflation provisions to compensate for increases 
in crew wages, stores and subsistence, maintenance, and 
insurance.  Provision for loss of the ship was also included. 
THE POLITICS AND POLEMICS OF THE MPS DEAL 
From its formal authorization by the Secretary of Defense in 
August 1979, to its approval by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) in December 1981 (to be included in the 1983 
Budget), the TAKX Program moved along without any significant 
challenges or controversy.  It was first authorized by Congress in 
September 1980.  The tax aspects of the lease contract were 
reviewed with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in November 1981.  
The Navy commissioned a financial review by the international 
accounting firm Coopers and Lybrand (C&L) in February 1982.  C&L 
concluded that the lease agreement was substantially cheaper for the 
government than purchasing the ships, when considering the net 
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present value of all payments over the term of the lease, based on 
existing laws and tax regulations (Bailey & Escoe, 2004).  In response 
to the RFP, several bids were received in March 1982.  In April 1982, 
AGL began its work to help the Navy zero-in on the best bids and 
begin signing contracts. 
However, Congressional interest in the TAKX Program increased 
in 1982.    In early May, the Secretary of the Navy, John F. Lehman, 
received inquiries from Congress as to whether the TAKX Program 
complied with federal standards in support of the American Merchant 
Marine and the American shipbuilding industry.  Secretary Lehman 
responded by letter in late May to the House Appropriations 
Committee, assuring them that all federal standards were being fully 
met (Haslam, Koenig, & Mitchell, 2004). 
A letter from the Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee of the 
House Appropriations Committee to Secretary Lehman, dated July 20, 
1982, noted that the 1980 authorization by Congress presumed 
procurement of the MPS through normal appropriations channels.  
Congressman Joseph Addabbo directed the Navy not to enter into any 
contractual agreements until a Surveys and Investigations (S&I) 
report could be commissioned and completed (Addabbo, 1982a). 
Secretary Lehman agreed to this request on July 30. 
On August 17, the Senate Armed Forces Committee and the 
House Appropriations Committee notified the Navy that they were 
undertaking a review of the TAKX lease contracts under Section 303 
of the FY1983 Authorization Act.  Section 303 required a 30-day 
review period for Congress to determine that leasing was preferable 
to purchasing through normal appropriations channels before lease 
contracts could be signed. 
By mid-August, AGL’s own financial analysis of the lease program 
confirmed C&L’s favorable conclusion (Argent, 1982). Based on a 
firm belief that the Deal was “cost-effective,” the Navy awarded 
contracts for six TAKX ships on August 17, 1982, with the option for 
seven additional ships during the 1983 fiscal year (Haslam, Koenig, & 
Mitchell, 2004).  These contracts were publicly announced on August 
18.  The next day, AGL released its conclusion that the net present 
value of each lease was $140.6 million versus a net purchase cost of 
$184.0 million per ship (Argent, 1982). 
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One major component of the attractiveness of the leases to 
private owners was a tax savings from the use of accelerated 
depreciation.  Under applicable laws in 1981, the owners of the TAKX 
ships could use a five-year life and the Accelerated Cost Recovery 
System (ACRS) rates.  In 1982, there was significant public 
indignation about the drain on the US Treasury from these generous 
tax “write offs” for wealthy private investors, which Congress had 
enacted in 1981 (Haslam, Koenig, & Mitchell, 2004).  Many in 
Congress were sympathetic to this criticism of “special tax deals.”  In 
1982, Congress passed the “Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act 
(TEFRA),” which eliminated special tax benefits due to short tax lives 
and accelerated depreciation for assets used by non-profit entities.  
The TEFRA provision would have reduced the present value of the 
depreciation tax benefits on each TAKX ship by $8.3 million, but 
TEFRA did not become effective until December 1983, by which time 
all the TAKX ships were already under construction. 
Another component of the tax incentives to the lessor/owners 
was the Investment Tax Credit (ITC), which existed in the tax code at 
this time.  If the leases qualified for the ITC, 10 percent of the 
purchase cost of the ships was available to the owner as an 
immediate tax credit.  Both C&L and AGL argued that the leases 
qualified for the ITC (Argent Group, 1982).  However, this tax benefit 
depended on the owners, not the Navy, having significant risks of 
ownership.  A ruling by the IRS on December 10, 1984, disallowed 
the ITC for the owners (Forman, 1983; 1985).  This ruling resulted in 
an increase in the annual lease payment to compensate the owners 
for the lost tax benefits.   
On September 1, 1982, the Surveys and Investigations (S&I) 
Report commissioned by Congress to review the MPS was released.  
It confirmed the cost advantage of leasing over purchasing for then 
current discount rates.  The report also confirmed the 
appropriateness of the 10 percent interest rate used in the AGL 
analysis under applicable OMB and DoD regulations (Anderson, 
1982). 
However, the S&I Report raised a major concern that the TAKX 
Program should increase encumbrances to the Navy Industrial Fund 
(NIF).  The TAKX leases presumed that only the annual lease 
payments would be charged against the NIF, year by year.  The S&I 
Report noted instead that the present value of all future lease 
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commitments and potential termination penalties would need to be 
encumbered in the NIF, as a matter of law.  Since the leases’ full 
present value exceeded $2.6 billion and the NIF’s current 
unencumbered balance was about $2.2 billion (Anderson, 1982), the 
Navy faced an unexpected problem of a potential Anti-Deficiency Act 
violation 
Meanwhile, both the Senate Armed Forces Committee and the 
House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee notified the Navy on 
September 16, one day before their 30-day deadline, that the 
provisions of Article 303 of the 1983 Authorization Act were 
successfully met and the lease contracts could proceed (Addabbo, 
1982b).     
Also, on September 17, 1982, the House Subcommittee on 
Readiness held a hearing on the TAKX Program.  Chairman Dan 
Daniel expressed serious dissatisfaction with the leases which he 
said inappropriately circumvented the Congressional 
authorization/appropriations process and thus impeded effective 
legislative review.  He noted that the leases obligated the 
Government to 25 years of lease payments or to substantial 
termination penalties if the leases were terminated.  He concluded 
that although the TAKX leases were already approved, he would do 
his utmost to see that appropriate action was taken to prevent a 
recurrence of similar lease programs (Sawyer, Daniel, & Gottlieb, 
1982). 
On December 2, 1982, the Comptroller of the Navy requested 
that the US General Accounting Office (GAO) examine the question 
regarding the encumbrance to the NIF.  The GAO (1983) reported on 
January 28, 1983, that the Navy must encumber the NIF for five 
years of lease payments (the initial guarantee period) plus the full 
termination payments that would be due in five years if the leases 
were cancelled.  This requirement would likely over-encumber the 
NIF, which was a violation of Anti-Deficiency laws.  The GAO raised no 
legal objection to the TAKX leases, as long as the NIF had sufficient 
available unencumbered funds.  If not, the GAO suggested that the 
Navy seek explicit legislative action to resolve this issue (U.S. 
Comptroller General, 1982). 
The Navy sought Congressional action and the Supplemental 
Appropriations Act of 1983 (P.L. 95-63) authorized the Navy to 
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proceed with the TAKX Program in the absence of an appropriation 
covering the total termination liability under the leases.  This 
legislation kept the TAKX program on track, but it did not resolve the 
NIF encumbrance issue. 
Please note as a final legal action to settle the NIF encumbrance 
issue, a specific provision of the Appropriations Act of 1985 (P.L. 98-
473) required the Navy to annually encumber the NIF for only that 
year’s lease payments and 10 percent of the possible termination 
fees.  Without this special legislation, the TAKX leases would have 
over-encumbered the NIF. 
On February 15, 1983 the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) 
issued a comprehensive analysis of the TAKX leases that contradicted 
the AGL conclusion that leasing was more cost effective than 
purchase (Foreman, 1983).  The JCT’s overriding premise was that 
leasing is only cheaper if the borrowing cost of the lessor is lower 
than the borrowing cost of the lessee.  Since the Federal Government 
(the lessee) has the lowest borrowing cost, the TAKX program 
compensated the lessors for higher financing costs than the 
Government’s costs if it had borrowed the money and purchased the 
ships.  The JCT report also challenged many of the assumptions and 
calculations in the AGL report with detailed alternative calculations.  
The JCT concluded that leasing each ship was $9.7 million more 
expensive than purchasing.  The difference between the AGL and JCT 
positions will be summarized in a later section of this article.   
On February 23, 1983, Senator Metzenbaum wrote to the 
Secretary of the Treasury to describe parts of the TAKX leases as an 
“outrageous” subsidization by the Navy of a lawsuit against the IRS 
(Foreman, 1983).  He reasoned that a provision in the TAKX lease 
rates allowed increases if the IRS were to reject any of the tax 
benefits in the contract.  Senator Metzenbaum argued that this 
amounted to the Navy paying the legal costs of private investors 
seeking to overrule the IRS. 
An article in the Washington Post on February 25, 1983, 
reiterated Senator Metzenbaum’s charges under the headline—“Navy 
Promises Suppliers Tax Breaks” (Edsall, 1983). The Navy’s response 
was that the contracts constituted very normal business practice 
regarding tax issues of leveraged-lease deals.  The Washington Post, 
however, likened these “tax breaks” to the buying and selling of tax 
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advantages by wealthy investors that were targeted by Congress in 
the pending TEFRA legislation.  Previously, on January 31, 1983, a 
Washington Post article entitled, “Rent-a-Navy,” concluded that the 
TAKX Program should be terminated because the lost tax revenue to 
the Treasury was hidden forever from public scrutiny.  Also, it argued 
that the TAKX leases should be prohibited as a blatant “evasion of 
budgetary limits” (“Rent-a-Navy,” 1983).  Apparently, the Washington 
Post also viewed the TAKX leases as bad public policy. 
Congressional debate continued on the cost efficiency of the 
TAKX leases.  On February 28, 1983, Chairman Charles Rangel of the 
Subcommittee on Oversight of the House Ways and Means 
Committee held hearings questioning the Navy’s circumvention of 
Congressional review and oversight of the TAKX leases.  Everett Pyatt, 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and 
Logistics), testified that the use of “commercial standards” versus 
“military standards” saved the Navy $35 million per ship (Pyatt, 
1983).  He argued that the existing appropriations law would have 
required the use of “military standards,” which were inappropriate for 
a cargo ship.  Following the hearings, on March 18, 1983, Chairman 
Rangel sent a public letter to the Secretary of the Navy, John Lehman 
(Rangel, 1983).  Secretary Lehman’s response reiterated the terms of 
the leases.  Chairman Rangel’s Subcommittee subsequently 
acknowledged they had no continuing objections to the TAKX Program 
(Haslam, Koenig, & Mitchell, 2004) 
On March 25, 1983, AGL issued a comprehensive rebuttal to the 
JCT report which challenged the bases for the JCT opinion that leasing 
was not cost effective (Argent Group, 1983).  The original AGL report, 
the JCT rebuttal, and the AGL response are very lengthy, complex, and 
technical documents, which require very careful study of difficult 
business concepts.   The August 1982 AGL report served its purpose 
as a careful report from a credible professional source that 
reaffirmed the superiority of leasing over buying (Argent Group, 
1982).  The JCT rebuttal of February 1983 challenged the superiority 
of leasing from a credible, professional source (U.S. Joint Committee 
on Taxation, 1983). The AGL response in March 1983 served its 
purpose of reasserting the superiority of leasing by carefully rebutting 
all of the challenges raised by the JCT.  There was no additional 
response to the AGL refutation. 
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Following publication of the different complex present value 
outcomes, the Navy was still convinced that leasing was cost 
effective.  Furthermore, all necessary Congressional pre-approvals 
had been obtained in public disclosures.  There was never an attempt 
to hide the transactions from public oversight.   
Alternative leasing analyses presented different public policy 
positions on financing arrangements for the use of assets required 
for a military mission.  It is important to present an analytic base for 
one’s policy positions, just as it is important to present an analytic 
base when challenging a policy.  The complex intellectual arguments 
and counterarguments regarding the cost-effectiveness of the TAKX 
leases were designed more to influence policy than to advance 
understanding.  These arguments are important in understanding the 
political success of the program.  They also are important in 
understanding the success of the program’s opponents in stopping 
any repetition. But the role they played is largely unrelated to the 
supporting analysis.   
Although the Congressional and public media challenges to the 
TAKX Program stopped by June 1983 and the ships were being built, 
Congressional attention focused on ensuring that similar leasing 
arrangements would never be repeated in the federal government by 
enacting the legislation detailed in the next section. 
Political Response to the Approval of the TAKX Program 
The MPS were not yet completed when three legislative actions 
were enacted which were clearly intended to give Congress greater 
oversight and to prevent future government leasing programs similar 
to the TAKX Program.  In June 1983, the GAO issued an analytic 
report on the use of leasing by DoD in which it recommended 
legislation that would prevent any future long-term leases without 
Congressional analysis and authorization (U.S. Comptroller General, 
1983). As a result, the Defense Authorization Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-
94) contained specific conditions for future leases by DoD:  
- All DoD long-term leases must be specially authorized by law. 
- A notice of intent to solicit such leases must be given to the 
appropriate committees in both houses of Congress. 
SAN MIGUEL, SHANK & SUMMERS  163 
 
- A detailed justification for lease versus purchase must be 
submitted to Congress and that justification must be approved by 
the OMB and Treasury. 
- The OMB and Treasury must jointly issue guidelines as to when 
leasing may be appropriate. 
Clarification of just how restrictive these conditions would be soon 
followed.  The required joint OMB/Treasury guidelines were published 
in 1984 and required that any special tax incentives for ship owners 
(such as accelerated depreciation) be disregarded in any lease versus 
purchase analysis for DoD leases.  In related action, The Deficit 
Reduction Act of 1984 (P.L. 98-369) disallowed accelerated 
depreciation tax deductions to the owners of all assets leased to 
Government entities.  The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit 
Control Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-177) further restricted leasing by 
requiring full up front budgetary authority for the estimated present 
value of all estimated obligations over the life of any lease.   
Finally, OMB Circular A-94, dated October 29, 1992, requires that 
any lease versus purchase analysis must exclude consideration of 
any tax revenues to the Treasury from lease payments received by the 
lessor and must use the Treasury’s borrowing cost as the discount 
rate.   This is a significant limitation on leasing, because a lower 
discount rate makes the lease option less attractive. 
Thus, within a few years, Congress, GAO, OMB, and the Treasury 
Department created new laws or established new regulations that 
made future government long-term leases virtually impossible. 
Unraveling the Present Value Polemic 
As noted earlier, AGL originally concluded that leasing was $43.4 
million cheaper, per ship, while the JCT concluded that leasing was 
$9.7 million more expensive.  AGL’s rebuttal to the JCT showed 
leasing as still $34.2 million cheaper than purchasing.  The 
differences are due primarily to the impact of the tax aspects of the 
TAKX program on Treasury revenues.  The leasing advantage depends 
on the impact on Treasury revenue from interest income and 
depreciation deductions.   
Table 2 summarizes the key differences between the AGL, JCT, 
and the authors’ (SSS) positions.  Conclusions about the key 
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differences are also included.  Both the JCT and AGL reports ran to 
more than sixty pages.  Whether leasing is cheaper or not hinges on 
three judgments about the impact of the TAKX program on Treasury 
revenues. The conclusion is that leasing was substantially more cost-
effective than purchase−$64.4 million per ship.  In a sensitivity 
analysis of this conclusion, calculations show that leasing is cost-
effective at interest rates as low as 5 percent (the prevailing interest 
rate as recently as 2005).   This is fairly strong evidence of the cost 
effectiveness of the TAKX program under the conditions that existed 
in the early 1980s. 
THE DESIRABILITY OF LEASING: TODAY’S PERSPECTIVE 
A significant advantage not quantified in the alternative analyses 
by proponents and opponents of the TAKX leases was its impact on 
the availability of the ships.  Leasing reduced the acquisition cycle 
time from five to seven years to about two years.  The normal 
acquisition process for DoD assets requires lengthy, detailed steps 
and documentation. The benefits from satisfying the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations (FAR) established by Congress are assumed 
to exceed the costs involved.  Annual lease payments included in 
operation and maintenance budgets avoid the costs. 
Another omitted advantage in the debate was that the use of 
commercial shipbuilding standards reduced the planned cost of each 
TAKX ship by $35 million ($182 million versus $217 million).  
Actually, the thirteen MPS were built for an average ship cost of 
$177.9 million.  The authors believe there are at least four conditions 
under which leasing should not be viewed so unfavorably. 
When Support Equipment is Mission Critical and Funding Is Not 
Available 
Since the end of the cold war the military has consistently 
experienced tight budget constraints.  During any budget year, there 
are always programs that go unfunded.  The all-important question is 
“How critical is the unfunded program for national security?”  For a 
military requirement that is mission critical, perhaps long-term leasing 
is a viable option.  It allows the Government to use assets 
immediately and spread the cash outlays over the lease period rather 
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TABLE 2 
Comparing Purchase to Three Different Viewpoints on the Net Total Cost 
to the Government from Leasing (5% Semiannual Discounting = 10.25% 
per Year) (In Millions)  
 AGL JCT SSS 
Shipping Cost If Purchased (182.4) (178.2)1 (182,4) 
Tax revenue from interest on Treasury Bonds 
Issued to finance the purchase 
 39.7 2.52 
Total Present Value with Purchase (182.4) (138.5) (179.9) 
Present value of 25 years of capital hire 
payments by the Navy 
(135.1) (135.1) (135.1) 
Residual value payments by the Navy at 
termination, net of tax 
(1.7) (1.7) (1.7) 
Lost tax revenue from the amortization 
deduction 
(.7) (.7) (.7) 
Tax payments by the lessor on capital hire 
payments received (46% tax rate) 
   
Return of capital component 22.0 22.0 22.0 
Interest component3 39.7 39.7 - 
Lost tax revenue from depreciation deductions4 (72.4) (72.4) - 
Total PV with Leasing (148.2) (148.2) (115.5) 
Leasing benefit versus purchase 34.2 (9.7) 64.4 
 
than front-loading 100 percent of the cost in an appropriation.  Thus, 
leasing can provide the Government with an extremely powerful tool 
to augment defense requirements beyond what would normally be 
available within limited funds. 
When Leasing Provides Advantages Over Procurement 
In the normal military procurement process, before Congress 
approves or appropriates procurement funds it must receive an 
Operations Requirements Document (ORD).  This contains detailed 
operating characteristics and military specifications for each item of 
military equipment.  The military specifications generally require 
higher standards than commercially built items.  Unique features 
and/or functions for military use almost always increase purchase 
costs.  However, the objectives are to ensure survivability and mission 
execution. 
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The primary objective for MPS vessels was to operate in a 
peaceful environment with only a slight possibility of going in harm’s 
way.  Thus, it was not necessary to build the TAKX ships to military 
specifications. However, normal acquisition policy would require the 
use of military specifications as the construction standard.  As 
pointed out earlier, building the ships to commercial standards (ABS) 
resulted in Government cost savings of $35 million per ship. 
Leasing also provides another advantage because, by contract, 
the Navy was not allowed to intervene in the commercial construction 
process.  Each shipyard incurred severe penalties for delays in 
delivery of the completed ship.  Furthermore, design changes were 
not allowed. In fact, severe penalties were imposed for late delivery of 
any ship.  These factors motivated the shipbuilder to stay on schedule 
and ensured on-time delivery.  The ships were in use within about 24 
months. 
In situations where commercial design can be adequate, 
construction under private ownership can avoid the delays and 
changes common in military-initiated construction.  Such changes 
often place the project over-budget which increases Congressional 
oversight.  The ability to avoid all these problems through leasing may 
be extremely beneficial in terms of delivery and mission when the 
assets do not require special design to military specifications. 
Therefore, leasing should be considered a viable option when the 
military requirement can be filled with a “commercial-off-the-shelf” 
(COTS) application such as computers, medical equipment, standard 
industrial components, or general purpose supply equipment.   Since 
the COTS item is designed and built for a specific use, the lengthy 
procurement process is not necessary. 
When Timing is Critical 
It might also be advantageous to lease when a requirement is 
mission-essential and there is not sufficient time for the full 
procurement process.  Shortly after 9-11, for example, there were a 
multitude of immediate security requirements.  One viable option for 
fulfilling some of these requirements could have been long-term 
leases. Arguably, this context might have applied to the refueling 
tankers which the Air Force wanted to lease from Boeing in 2002.  By 
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using leasing, the Government could have fulfilled its requirements in 
a much shorter time and at greatly reduced up-front outlays.   
Reduced Present Value of Outflows 
Based on the analyses in Table 2, the reduced present value of 
outflows can also be an additional inducement for leasing when one 
or more of the other conditions cited here are present. 
CURRENT LEGISLATIVE CONTEXT 
Today leasing as a part of acquisition strategy is effectively 
prohibited by legislation passed in 1984 and 1985, and by OMB 
Circular A-94, as discussed earlier.  Re-opening the leasing option 
would require re-evaluating four consciously constructed 
impediments.  Each of these is examined next. 
Tax Deductibility of Depreciation Expense 
The Economic Recovery Act of 1981 allowed companies to realize 
accelerated depreciation tax benefits over a very short time period.  
Under this Act, ACRS depreciation schedules allowed a five-year 
depreciation period for TAKX ships.  The 25-year term of the lease 
was not relevant here.  ACRS also permitted more depreciation in the 
early years than straight-line depreciation, which provided a 
significant advantage in the time value of money calculations.  The 
present value of this depreciation tax shelter was over $72 million per 
ship, a major component of the economic return to the private 
investors. 
In 1984, the Deficit Reduction Act (P.L. 98-369) modified tax laws 
to disallow taxpayers the use of ACRS for assets leased to tax-exempt 
entities such as the Government.  The Legislation also reduced the 
impact of the tax benefits by lengthening the tax life for depreciation 
to a period equal to 125 percent of the lease term.  While this 
Legislation was not retroactive, if the TAKX vessels had been built 
after 1984, depreciation lives would have been increased from 5 
years to 31.25 years.  
While the 1984 Act significantly discouraged leasing by reducing 
the tax benefits, a 1984 OMB ruling disallowed all depreciation 
deductions for leases to the Government.  If the military hopes to 
foster an environment where owners desire to lease to the military, 
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Congress needs to re-institute the ability of lessors to take 
depreciation deductions, at least on a straight-line basis over the 
useful life of the asset. 
NIF Encumbrance 
The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 
(P.L. 99-177) required DoD to request up-front budget authority for 
the estimated full present value of all long-term lease payments and 
termination provisions.  This is a complete reversal of the reason that 
leasing was established over forty years ago in the private sector. One 
of the benefits of leasing in the commercial world is the ability to 
spread payments over the asset’s useful life.  If American Airlines 
were required to pay 100 percent of the present value of future lease 
payments for a new airplane at the start of the lease, leasing would 
be of no value.  The same concept applies to the Government.   
If the Government requires its agencies to obligate the sum of 
total payments for the first option period plus the termination value 
(which virtually equals the cost of the total lease) then it will never 
make financial sense to lease.  In order to make Government leasing 
a viable financing option, special legislation is needed to frame lease 
payments as annual obligations.  In this way, the Navy and other 
military services would not encumber their Working Capital Fund 
(such as the NIF) beyond one year. 
Full Cash Flows to the Government 
In a broader context, a comprehensive cost/benefit analysis for 
the leasing option should include the cash flow implications for the 
Treasury, as well as the Navy.  OMB (1992) Circular A-94 rules out 
considering Treasury cash flows in the analysis.  Why should an 
important part of the analysis be excluded?  To be economically 
realistic, evaluations of leasing options in the private sector include 
all cash flows, especially the tax consequences that often drive the 
decision.  In fact, present value or time value of money techniques 
are widely used for the very reason that amounts and timing of all 
cash flows are accurately quantified.    
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Prior Approval 
The 1984 Department of Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 98-94) 
further restricted Government leasing by requiring all long-term 
leases with substantial termination values to be specifically 
authorized by law.  It further required Congressional notification prior 
to issuing a solicitation for leasing.   Finally, the Act required a present 
value cost comparison be submitted to Congress after OMB and 
Treasury Department reviews and evaluations.  Given the above 
exclusions of specific tax and cash flows in lease evaluations by OMB 
and Treasury, this law effectively eliminates serious consideration of 
leasing. 
In summary, these three laws and regulations make it nearly 
impossible for leasing to be an effective long-term financing 
alternative to traditional purchasing.  Without reversals of these laws 
and regulations, DoD departments are constrained to use the full 
procurement process for all military requirements no matter what the 
urgency or mission in providing and maintaining national security. 
CONCLUSION 
Which is more important to National Security in today’s overall 
political context: full compliance with the conventional appropriations 
process; or allowing the possibility of leasing, under certain specified 
circumstances, which circumvents much of the conventional 
process? 
With a different legislative context and regulatory climate, leasing 
could provide DoD and military departments with a potentially viable 
long-term financing tool.   Whether such action is desirable depends 
on a personal interpretation of the current environment that 
effectively precludes leasing and the existing threats to national well-
being.  This research was intended to review the Navy’s experience 
with the TAKX Program to frame a discussion of the prospective 
efficacy of such programs today. 
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NOTES 
1. The JCT report excludes from the purchase cost $4.2 million in 
base year legal costs paid to arrange the purchase contracts.  
AGL treats those costs as part of the purchase price. 
2. This analysis does not assume that the purchase would be fully 
funded out of tax revenues (as AGL originally did) or fully funded 
by Treasury borrowing (as JCT did). The SSS analysis assumes 
that the purchase is financed by a mix of tax revenues and 
government borrowing that reflects the overall percentage of 
deficit financing in the federal budget that year (21% deficit 
financing via Treasury borrowing). Also, assume the purchasers of 
Treasury bonds were, on average, in a 13.5% tax bracket because 
many investors pay no US tax at all (foreign investors and tax 
exempt organizations).  Thus, the government will receive only 
6.2% as much tax revenue as if the purchase price was all 
borrowed from investors who were in the normal 46% tax bracket 
[.21*(.135/.46)=.062]. The $2.5 million offset to the purchase 
price is 6.2% of the multiyear present value of the full tax revenue 
from interest income under the lease option ($39.7 million).  
3. AGL counts the present value of the tax payments by the lessor 
on the interest component of the capital hire payments as 
revenue to the Treasury and thus as an offset to the Navy cost.  
The JCT report argued that the investors would receive taxable 
interest income and pay tax on it regardless of whether they 
invest in the TAKX leases or something else.  The item is thus not 
incremental to the TAKX deal and should not be offset against the 
lease cost.  AGL argued that investors would put their money in 
tax exempt investments if the TAKX leases were not available.  
Thus, the tax revenue is incremental to the TAKX deal.  The SSS 
analysis views the JCT is correct that investors would earn taxable 
interest, whether or not they invested in the TAKX leases. Thus, 
the SSS analysis does not include this offset as incremental to 
the TAKX leases. 
4. This item is the present value of the depreciation deductions 
available to the ship owners.  AGL and the JCT argue that this 
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item represents lost tax revenue to the Treasury and thus is 
considered an additional cost of the TAKX leases.  The SSS 
analysis, as AGL argued elsewhere in their report, assumes that 
there is a finite pool of investment funds for leveraged lease 
deals, based on the pool of investors sophisticated enough to 
understand such deals and act on them.  The TAKX deal does not 
change the total pool; it only allocates a portion of it to the 
government because of the favorable risk/return profile (an 
11.745% after-tax return on a “hell or high water” basis with the 
federal government).  The leveraged-lease investors will gain 
these tax deductions, whether or not the TAKX leases exist.  Thus, 
the lost tax revenue is not incremental to the TAKX Program and 
should not be considered an additional cost of the deal. 
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